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Holy Scriptures and Unholy Strictures:
Why the Enforcement of a Religious Orthodoxy in
North Carolina Demands a More Refined
Establishment Clause Analysis of Courtroom Oaths
Daniel Blau*
INTRODUCTION
In June 2005, Syidah Matteen was called as a witness during
a state court proceeding in Guilford County, North Carolina.
When it came time to swear under oath, Ms. Matteen, a Muslim,
requested that she be allowed to swear in on the Qu'ran.' The
judge refused this request.2 Later that month, the Al Ummil
Ummat Islamic Center of Greensboro offered to donate copies of
the Qu'ran to the Guilford County courts to use to swear in Muslim
jurors and witnesses, but this request was also turned down by
judicial officials.3 The American Civil Liberties Union of North
Carolina (ACLU-NC) was informed of the incidents, and so began
a statewide debate4 over the proper interpretation of the state's
Juris Doctor Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law,
2007.
1. Letter from Shelagh Kenney, Staff Attorney, American Civil Liberties
Union of N.C. (ACLU-NC), and Seth Cohen, General Counsel, ACLU-NC
Legal Foundation, to Ralph Walker, Director, N.C. Administrative Office of
the Courts (June 28, 2005) (on file with author).
2. Radio interview by Donna Martinez, Carolina Journal Radio, with
Jennifer Rudinger, Executive Director, ACLU-NC, in Raleigh, N.C. (Aug. 19,
2005), available at http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display-
exclusive.html?id=2722.
3. Amended Complaint, ACLU of N.C. v. N.C., No. 05 CVS 9872 (filed
Nov. 30, 2005).
4. These incidents and the resulting ACLU-NC lawsuit were covered
extensively by both the print media as well as talk radio. See, e.g., Yonat
Shimron, ACLU Seeks Religious Inclusiveness in Court Oaths, RALEIGH NEWS
& OBSERVER, July 27, 2005, at Al, available at http://newsobserver.com/news/
story/2630881p-9067516c.html; Civil Liberties Group Sues N.C. Regarding
Courtroom Oaths, GREENSBORO NEWS-RECORD, July 26, 2005, available at
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oath statutes, as well as the proper use of religious texts in the
state's courtrooms.
Under North Carolina statute, a person who is to be sworn
in any official proceeding is provided three different options. First,
section 11-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes (hereinafter "§
11-2") provides the "default" option for the swearing party:
[T]he party shall] lay his hand upon the Holy
Scriptures, in token of his engagement to speak
the truth and in further token that, if he should
swerve from the truth, he may be justly
deprived of all the blessings of that holy book
and made liable to that vengeance which he has
imprecated on his own head.6
In refusing requests to allow the use of the Qu'ran, Guilford
County judges have stated that, under this statute, the Christian
Bible is the only "Holy Scripture" allowed for oath administration.
Second, under an adjacent statute, if the party is "conscientiously
scrupulous" of placing his or her hand upon the "Holy Scriptures,"
he or she shall recite the applicable oath "with his right hand lifted
up towards heaven, in token of his solemn appeal to the Supreme
God . ,. Third, if the party altogether objects to taking a
religious oath, he or she may simply affirm, meaning that he or she
would recite the applicable oath "except that the word 'affirm' shall
be substituted for the word 'swear' and the words 'so help me God'
shall be deleted."9
http://www.newsrecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050726/NEWSREC
0101/50726010; Radio interview by Donna Martinez, supra note 2.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-2 (2005).
6. Id.
7. Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-3 (2005).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-4 (2005). For example, the default oath used to
swear in an attorney at law is: "I, A. B., do swear that I will truly and honestly
demean myself in the practice of an attorney, according to the best of my
knowledge and ability; so help me God." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-11 (2005).
One who wished to affirm under § 11-4 would instead recite: "I, A. B., do
affirm that I will truly and honestly demean myself in the practice of an
attorney, according to the best of my knowledge and ability."
On June 28, 2005, the ACLU-NC requested that ihe North
Carolina Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) "adopt a
policy to enable members of different faiths to be sworn in on the
religious text honored by their faith if they choose."' The ACLU-
NC, joined by the Council on American-Islamic Relations and
other Muslim and interfaith religious groups, requested that Qu'ran
use be permitted in order to respect religious diversity." The AOC
refused to issue an interpretation of § 11-2, claiming that its proper
interpretation was a matter for the judiciary and the legislature.12
In addition to the issue of religious equality, the fact that
Ms. Matteen was not allowed to swear on the Qu'ran troubled the
ACLU-NC because state judicial officials had previously been
willing to interpret § 11-2 broadly to allow the use of the Qu'ran
when such an interpretation was necessary to serve the needs of the
state. During a 2004 trial in North Carolina Superior Court, for
example, a potential juror requested to be sworn in on the Qu'ran
during the voir dire. The clerk of court consulted the judge, who
responded that the potential juror's request should be granted
because, due to low turnout of the juror pool, the court could not
afford to lose a potential juror. The clerk procured a Qu'ran from
the North Carolina Bar Association, and the juror was sworn as
requested.
3
In July 2005, the ACLU-NC filed suit against North
Carolina in Wake County Superior Court, claiming that "[b]y
allowing only the Christian Bible to be used in the administration of
religious oaths in the courtroom, the State is discriminating against
people of non-Christian faiths.' 4  The organization, claiming
standing on behalf of its 8,000 religiously diverse members,15 sought
a declaratory judgment that the term "Holy Scriptures" in § 11-2
10. Letter from Shelagh Kenney, supra note 1.
11. Press Release, ACLU-NC, ACLU-NC Files Lawsuit Challenging
Religious Discrimination by N.C. Courts (July 2005) (on file with author).
12. Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
13. Telephone conversation with a North Carolina clerk of court (name
and location withheld) (July 13, 2005) (notes from conversation on file with
author); see also Shimron, supra note 4.
14. Press Release, supra note 11.
15. Amended Complaint, supra note 3.
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includes dll religious texts;16 or, if § 11-2 was found to only include
the Christian Bible, that the statute was unconstitutional in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.r The state's Answer did not reach
these substantive issues, but instead sought to dismiss the ACLU's
claims for lack of standing, arguing that because Ms. Matteen chose
to affirm, no actual case or controversy existed between the
parties.1
8
The case was heard in Wake County Superior Court on
December 5, 2005. Four days later, Judge Donald Smith issued a
brief order finding that the court lacked jurisdiction because no
justiciable controversy existed between the parties.19 The ACLU-
NC is appealing Judge Smith's decision.0
This Note examines the legality of North Carolina's
interpretation of its oath statute, and uses this debate as an
opportunity to analyze our country's historical practice of allowing
religious oaths in courtrooms. Part I examines the history of the
oath as an institution of society, as well as the history of North
Carolina's oath statute. Part II considers North Carolina's common
law regarding religious swearing, and concludes that its oath statute
is violative of state common law. Part III introduces the relevant
Establishment Clause analyses, applies the constitutional rules to
North Carolina's oath statute, and concludes that the statute is
likely unconstitutional. Part IV then considers the constitutionality
of religious swearing in courtrooms generally, determines that
previous Establishment Clause analysis in this area has been
incomplete, and concludes that re-application of the appropriate
constitutional tests to courtroom swearing raises serious concerns at
each step of the Establishment Clause analysis.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Answer to Amended Complaint, ACLU of N.C. v. N.C., No. 05 CVS
9872 (filed Dec. 5, 2005).
19. Wake County Superior Court Order and Judgment, ACLU of N.C. v.
N.C., No. 05 CVS 9872 (filed Dec. 9, 2005).
20. Notice of Appeal, ACLU of N.C. v. N.C., No. 05 CVS 9872 (filed
Dec. 20,2005).
I. THE OATH: AN INSTITUTION OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
SOCIETY
A. The Origins of Oath Swearing
It has been suggested that it is a fact of human nature that a
person will lie if necessary to protect his or her own self-interests
and those of his or her family.' This leads to a general distrust
between members of society, for if one person will lie in self-
interest, then he or she will suspect another of committing similar
deception.22 As one scholar noted:
It is because we do not place confidence in the
veracity of men in general, when they profess
to speak the truth; it is because we cannot rely
upon their good faith, when they make a bare
promise, that we are driven to seek for
something more satisfactory to ourselves, by
imposing upon them a more binding
23
responsibility than that of their mere word.
Thus, the oath, which has been defined as "an outward
pledge given by [an individual] that his attestation [or promise] is
made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God," 24
developed as means to ensure a truthful exchange.2 The religious
oath as an institution has "been supposed in every age and country
of the world. '' 26 For example, the Greeks, Romans, Egyptians, and
Persians each crafted a variety of oaths for use in societal life in
21. Thomas Raeburn White, Oaths in Judicial Proceedings and Their
Effect upon the Competency of Witnesses, 51 U. PA. L. REV. (formerly AM. L.
REG.) 373, 373 (1903) ("Self-interest is perhaps the fundamental fact in human
nature. Every man naturally seeks to promote the welfare of himself and his
family before that of his neighbor .... [H]e will, if necessary, tell a lie for that
purpose.").
22. Id.
23. JAMES ENDELL TYLER, OATHS; THEIR ORIGIN, NATURE, AND
HISTORY 6 (1834).
24. Id. at 15 (first alteration added).
25. White, supra note 21, at 374.
26. TYLER, supra note 23, at 6.
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accordance with the prevailing religious beliefs of the respective
culture .27
Religious oaths were also prevalent in Mosaical and Biblical
law.28 In the Judeo-Christian tradition, oaths played an important
role both in lawsuits and in state affairs. 9 For example, in Exodus it
was written that a dispute between neighbors would be settled by
taking an oath before God. 3° The Decalogue invoked supernatural
punishment for false swearing: "You shall not misuse the name of
the Lord your God, for the Lord will not hold anyone guiltless who
misuses his name.",3' Additionally, it was required that the person
who "sins and is unfaithful to the Lord by... swear[ing] falsely...
when he thus sins and becomes guilty, he must ... make restitution
in full.
32
The use of religious oaths multiplied in the Christian world
after the Church grew populous and powerful.33 Placing one's hand
27. White, supra note 21, at 375. See generally TYLER, supra note 23, at
97-191 (providing a detailed discussion of oath forms adopted in the Old
Testament, Ancient Greece and Rome, China, India, Mexico, and modern
Europe). In Greece, for example, Homer's Iliad spoke of an oath ceremony in
which those swearing were "to mingle wine to typify the union and concord
which then prevailed between the parties, and then to offer a prayer and to
pour the wine on the ground, with an imprecation, that whoever should first
break the oath might have his brains and blood scattered in the same manner,
as that wine was poured." Id. at 120. In Rome, "[o]ne of the most ancient
forms of oath . . . was that of slaying an animal, very generally a swine, and
imprecating the curse of heaven, in case of falsehood, to fall as inevitably on
the perjured head, as death was the fate of that victim." Id. at 127. The
Chinese would attest to the truth by burning paper containing sacred
characters, by breaking saucers, or by decapitating fowl, believing that a party
violating his oath would suffer a similar fate. Id. at 165.
28. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 342 (Harper & Brothers 1852) (1765).
29. Bible History Online, International Standard Bible Encyclopedia:
"Oath," http://www.bible-history.com/isbe/o/oath (last visited Nov. 19, 2005)
(reviewing the nature and location of various oaths in the Old and New
Testaments).
30. Exodus 22:11 (New International Version) (noted at Bible History
Online, supra note 29).
31. Exodus 20:7 (noted at Bible History Online, supra note 29).
32. Leviticus 6:2-5 (noted at Bible History Online, supra note 29).
33. White, supra note 21, at 377.
on the Bible, kissing the text, 4 and raising the other hand towards
Heaven35 were common forms of swearing an oath. No matter the
particular form, the key element of the oath ceremony was the
invocation of God's vengeance if the swearer spoke falsely. God,
implicated as a witness to a lie, would "avenge the consequential
insult or blasphemy. 3 6  Thus, the oath acted to "frighten the
swearer into telling the truth, 37 not by calling upon God to "punish
the false swearer, but to remind the witness that [God] will
assuredly do so." '
The above examples demonstrate that oaths developed as
both a secular and religious tool for ensuring truthful testimony.
These dual elements were not separate and distinct; rather, they
worked in conjunction with one another3 9 to secure truthful
testimony by invoking a divine witness to guarantee that promise by
the threat of supernatural punishment. 4° In the United States, for
example, the South Carolina Supreme Court recognized in 1848
that the Bible oath was a daily acknowledgment of Christianity as
"the most solemn part of our administration."4 1 So, too, in North
Carolina, the religious oath also took root early in the state's
statutory development.
34. See id.
35. See, e.g., Genesis 14:22 ("Abram said to the king of Sodom, 'I have
raised my hand to the Lord, God Most High, Creator of heaven and earth, and
have taken an oath that I will accept nothing belonging to you .... "') (noted
at Bible History Online, supra note 29).
36. White, supra note 21, at 380. The penalty for bearing false witness
was only suggested in the Bible. See, e.g., 2 Samuel 3:35 ("David took an oath,
saying 'May God deal with me, be it ever so severely .... ') (noted at Bible
History Online, supra note 29).
37. White, supra note 21, at 380.
38. Virgil W. Duffie, Jr., The Requirement of a Religious Belief for
Competency of a Witness, 11 S.C. L. REV. (formerly S.C. L. Q.) 548 (1958-59).
39. With the advent of perjury laws and the affirmation option, however,
the religious and secular features of the oath would become separate and
distinct elements, each serving its own, independent purpose. See infra text
accompanying notes 122-25, 206-10.
40. See, e.g., Oliver v. State Tax Comm'n of Mo., 37 S.W.3d 243, 247 (Mo.
2001) (discussing the functions of Greek oaths).
41. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial
Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2111 (1996).
2006] COURTROOM OATHS 229
230 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol.4
B. North Carolina's Oath Statute
It comes as no surprise that religious oaths found early
42
support in the laws of North Carolina. In Engel v. Vitale, the
United States Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is an unfortunate fact
some of the groups which had most strenuously opposed the
established Church of England . . . passed laws making their
religion the official religion of their respective colonies. 4 1 While
early North Carolina state law did not technically create an official
religion, there is some evidence that a particular religion was
preferred. For example, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776
included a test oath that forbade officeholders from "deny[ing]...
the truth of the Protestant religion.""
The state's oath statutes may have likewise been part of an
effort to codify acceptable or official religious beliefs. First passed
in 1777, § 11-2 was originally entitled "Administration of oath upon
the Gospels., 45 Rather than requiring a swearer to lay his or her
hands upon the "Holy Scriptures," the swearer was to "lay his
hands upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God." 46 In 1856, the
North Carolina Supreme Court, while not directly addressing the
statute, adopted the English common law rule allowing a swearing
party to choose his or her own method of oath administration. In
1985, two centuries after the passage of the original oath statute,
the statute was amended by shortening the title to "Administration
of oaths," and by substituting the term "Holy Scriptures" for "Holy
Evangelists of Almighty God." 48  The legislature's intent was
arguably to make the statute more inclusive, so the Christian Bible
would no longer be the only religious text statutorily acceptable for
49
use in the swearing ceremony.
42. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
43. Id. at 427.
44. N.C. CONST. § XXXII, quoted in Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
14 n.17 (1947).
45. Letter from Shelagh Kenney, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 67-70.
48. Letter from Shelagh Kenney, supra note 1; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. §
11-2.
49. Id.
Not all North Carolinians have construed the state's oath
statute in this manner. By failing to allow Muslim witnesses to
swear on the Qu'ran,' state judicial officials have declined to adopt
an inclusive interpretation of § 11-2. Their narrow reading of the
statute, however, raises serious concerns regarding religious
inequality in North Carolina courts. These concerns must be
addressed by appraising the statute's legality under both state
common law and the Federal Constitution.
II. THE LEGALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S OATH STATUTE
UNDER COMMON LAW
A. Early Common Law and the Omichund Rule
Christianity predominated in England during the
development of the common law. Therefore, English oaths5'
presupposed the Christian faith of the witness." At early common
law, a witness was immediately disqualified if he or she did not
profess a belief in the Christian God.53 Thus, oaths directly invoked
the Christian God and were commonly taken upon the Bible.5
Only Christian oaths were deemed acceptable in English courts
"due to the spirit of intolerance which.., seemed to dominate most
religious people of early times. 55 The Church controlled both the
religious and secular spheres, and claimed that all non-Christians
were "wholly unfit to be believed.,
56
In 1744, the rigid religious test for witnesses and jurors was
significantly weakened by Omichund v. Barker.57  The English
50. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
51. For an example of the use of oaths in England, see BLACKSTONE,
supra note 28, at 342 (describing the use of an oath by a party to a suit as a
means of supporting his action should he lack the temporal evidence to do so).
52. White, supra note 21, at 386-87.
53. Duffie, supra note 38, at 548.
54. White, supra note 21, at 387.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744).
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court, faced with the question of admission of two religious but
non-Christian witnesses, held:
(1) That the oath is not a Christian institution,
but has existed from the earliest times. (2)
That an oath is of binding force when taken by
any person, Christian or infidel, if taken
according to the rites of his own religion. (3)
That the form of oath usually administered in
English courts is not essential, but that any
persons may be admitted sworn as above.8
All that was required to validate an oath, according to the
Omichund court, was "an appeal to a Supreme Being, and thinking
of Him as the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood." 59
This new rule, adopted in England 6° and followed in America,
permitted any witness professing a religious faith to be sworn in
according to his or her own religious dictates.1
James Madison recognized the inherent problems
associated with selecting a specific religious text for public use, even
in a predominantly Judeo-Christian society. In his notes from a
religious freedom debate in the Virginia legislature,62 Madison
wondered, "[w]hat edition, Hebrew, Septuagint, or vulgate? What
copy - what translation? ' '63 By the early nineteenth century, it was
firmly established in both England and America that "[t]he form of
administering an oath is by no means an essential part of the oath
itself, and indeed, being of human institution, is in itself a matter of
58. White, supra note 21, at 389-90 (summarizing the holding in
Omichund).
59. Duffie, supra note 38, at 548-49 (citing Omichund, 125 Eng. Rep.
1310 (Lord Hardwick, concurring)). Atheists and other nonbelievers,
however, were still "excluded from testifying" under the new rule. White,
supra note 21, at 390.
60. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 365 n.4 (referencing an
English statute requiring that "any person either as a juryman or a witness...
is bound by the oath administered, provided it shall have been administered in
such form and with such ceremonies as he may declare to be binding").
61. White, supra note 21, at 390.
62. See infra note 75 and text accompanying notes 75-79.
63. James Madison, Notes on Debate (Dec. 1784), in JAMES MADISON
ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 54 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
perfect indifference, provided ... the individual sworn regards it as
binding on his conscience."64 Nothing in more recent common law
appears to prohibit a juror or witness from swearing on his or her
own religious text, provided that the individual considers it binding
on the conscience. During the twentieth century, courts continued
to acknowledge the freedom to swear in accordance with one's
religious beliefs. For example, in 1945, an American military
tribunal allowed a Japanese soldier to swear on his beliefs in theS 61
ancient Japanese religion of Shinto. More recently, the federal
courts have allowed Muslim witnesses to invoke Allah in the
swearing ceremony.6
B. North Carolina Common Law
In 1856, the North Carolina Supreme Court officially
recognized the Omichund rule in Shaw v. Moore. 7 The court
acknowledged the old common law rule that only Christian
witnesses were competent to be sworn but then recognized that the
rule, "to say the least of it, is narrow-minded, illiberal, bigoted and
unsound." 68 The Shaw court then went further and determined that
the state's oath statutes merely provided a common form of oath
"adapted to the religious belief of the general mass of the citizens,
for the sake of convenience and uniformity." 69 Thus, the state could
not demand that a witness choose his or her oath ceremony from
only the listed suggestions, for this would, "despite of the progress
64. TYLER, supra note 23, at 89.
65. Patrik Jonsson, Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Tell the
Truth... on the Koran?, Christian Science Monitor, July 20, 2005, at 2, available
at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0720/p02s02-usju.htm.
66. Id. ("It's up to judges to decide what passes for an oath. Most have
apparently given [non-Christian] oaths wide latitude. In a federal terrorism
case in 1997 in Washington D.C., for instance, the judge allowed Muslim
witnesses to swear to Allah.").
67. 49 N.C. 37 (1856). Shaw has no subsequent appellate history and has
not been overturned or superseded.
68. Id. at 39.
69. Id. at 41.
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of the age . . . throw the country back upon the illiberal and
intolerant [old common law] rule.,
70
C. Conclusion: North Carolina's Oath Statute Violates State
Common Law
As in Omichund, nothing in the Shaw decision prohibits a
witness from selecting the religious text to be used in an oath
ceremony. If an Islamic juror or witness determines that swearing
on the Qu'ran is the ceremony "most sacred and obligatory on [his
or her] conscience[]," 7' the party's decision should be respected
under the common law principles articulated above.72 The form of
oath described in § 11-2 serves only as a default suggestion, and a
contrary interpretation by North Carolina judicial officials is at
odds with centuries-old, well-established common law.
70. Id. at 42.
71. Id.
72. But see Jonathan Belcher, Note, Religion-Plus-Speech: The
Constitutionality of Juror Oaths and Affirmations Under the First Amendment,
34 WM. & MARY L. REv 287, 329 (1992). The author argues that "expanding
the oath to allow 'personalized' alternative forms of ensuring truthfulness is in
direct opposition to the history of the oath," and the affirmation evolved as
the sole means of accommodating parties who objected to swearing an oath.
This argument appears to be at-odds with the well-settled rule in Omichund
and the subsequent development of American common law.
73. This statement is in accord with other codified state and federal law.
In Arkansas, for example, if a court is satisfied that the party to be sworn has a
non-statutory mode of swearing in which is "more solemn and obligatory in
the opinion of the person, the court ... may adopt that mode of swearing....
Every person believing in any religion other than the Christian religion shall
be sworn according to the peculiar ceremonies of his religion . . .instead of
any of the other modes . . . ." ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-2-101(d)-(e) (2005).
Similarly, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness is required to swear
or affirm "in a form calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress
the witness' mind with the duty to [testify truthfully]." FED. R. EVID. 603.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF NORTH CAROLINA'S OATH
STATUTE UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
74
A. Establishment Clause Jurisprudence
The early American debate over religious liberty came to a
head in 1785 when the Virginia legislature considered renewing a
tax designed to support the official church of the commonwealth.75
In his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance, 76 James Madison, a
major opponent of the tax, set out a compelling plea for religious
neutrality. His arguments were later summarized by the Supreme
Court: "[Madison] argued that a true religion did not need the
support of law ... ; that the best interest of a society required that
the minds of men always be wholly free; and that cruel persecutions
were the inevitable result of government-established religions.,
77
Madison's Remonstrance won the day and led to the enactment of
the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty., 78 Authored by Thomas
Jefferson, the Act established "[t]hat no man shall be compelled to
74. This Note focuses solely on the Establishment Clause issues raised by
Bible oaths. For a general discussion of the Free Exercise issues concerning
juror oaths and affirmations, see Belcher, supra note 72.
75. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11 (1947). The Virginia
debate arose out of concerns regarding religious persecution in Europe, which
had forced the early American settlers to seek refuge in the colonies. Id. at 8-
9. In Europe, government-favored churches had long coerced loyalty by
fining, imprisoning, torturing, or killing those who dissented from church
doctrine or who failed to pay taxes to support the church. Id. at 9. Such
practices, including compulsory taxation for church support, continued in early
America under the authority of those granted the power to colonize by
England. Id. at 9-10. Eventually, public sentiment against the taxes grew to a
boiling point. The Virginia colonists, weary of the powerful government-
sponsored church, became convinced that religious liberty and the
government's ability to levy a church tax were fundamentally at odds with one
another. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 12.
77. Id. For the full text of Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," see
James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 63, at 55-60.
78. Everson, 330 U.S. at 12.
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frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry ... nor
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief."79
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment"°
81
embodies these principles. It mandates that "neither a state nor
the Federal Government can ... pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.' '  Courts
originally interpreted the First Amendment as prohibiting
government from exhibiting a preference among the various
Christian sects; however, it was not thought to demand the same
level of respect either for adherents of non-Christian faiths,
including Islam, or for those who embraced no faith."' With the
development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, however, the
Supreme Court has "unambiguously concluded that the individual
freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment embraces
the right to select any religious faith or none at all.''4
The Court has enunciated a variety of tests for applying the
Establishment Clause to governmental action. The three-prong
Lemon test from the 1971 case Lemon v. Kurtzman85 is the starting
79. Thomas Jefferson, Act For Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted
in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 63, at 61.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.")
(emphasis added).
81. Everson, 330 U.S. at 11 ("It was these feelings [regarding the ills of
religious persecution] which found expression in the First Amendment.").
82. Id. at 15.
83. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985). The court noted:
At one time it was thought that [the right to refrain
from accepting the creed established by the majority]
merely proscribed the preference of one Christian sect
over another, but would not require equal respect for
the conscience of the infidel, the atheist, or the
adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or
Judaism.
Id. at 52.
84. Id. at 52-53.
85. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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point for most Establishment Clause analyses. The Lemon test
states: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an
'excessive government entanglement with religion."' 6  The
Supreme Court has not strictly followed the Lemon test, but it has
provided a rough framework for the Court to analyze religion
cases.8 Justice O'Connor refined the Lemon test in her
concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.8 She advocated for a two-prong
"purpose-and-effect" endorsement analysis, later adopted by the
Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,89 that examines both what
the government intended to communicate and what message the
government actually conveyedi 0 This test suggests a context-based,
objective approach to determining the constitutional validity of the
action in question from the perspective of the reasonable observer. 9'
86. Id. at 612-13 (internal citations omitted).
87. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) ("[W]e have often
found it useful to [rely on the Lemon factors] .. .[b]ut, we have repeatedly
emphasized our unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area."); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) ("[The Lemon
factors] are no more than helpful signposts ...."); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971). In Tilton, the court stated:
Every analysis must begin with the candid
acknowledgment that there is no single constitutional
caliper that can be used .... Instead, our analysis in
this area must begin with a consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed over many years and
applying to a wide range of governmental action
challenged as violative of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 677-78; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108-12 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(discussing the origins, alternatives to, and difficulties in application of the
Lemon test).
88. 465 U.S. at 690-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) ("Although Justice O'Connor joined the
majority opinion in Lynch, she wrote a concurrence that.., provides a sound
analytical framework for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols.").
90. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
91. See id. at 692 ("[The question is] what viewers may fairly understand
to be the purpose of the [creche] display . . . ."); see also id. at 694 ("Every
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine
whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
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The Court has also analyzed Establishment Clause cases by
asking if the government action in question coerces support or
participation in religion or in a religious exercise.9 This is
ostensibly an element of the "effect prong" of the Lynch
endorsement inquiry. Government is forbidden from using
coercion, whether direct or indirect, obvious or subtle, in an
"attempt to employ the machinery of the State to enforce a
religious orthodoxy."93 The presence of a coercive effect is also
context-based and may vary depending on the setting and the
person(s) allegedly injured by the coercion.94
Finally, the Supreme Court has justified religiously-based
government action by looking to the role of religion in our nation's
history and tradition. The Court has construed the Establishment
Clause "in light of the 'government policies of accommodation,
acknowledgment, and support for religion [that] are an accepted
part of our political and cultural heritage.... [T]he meaning of the
Clause is to be determined by reference to historical practices and
understandings.' '95 This test recognizes that some acknowledgment
of religion by the government is permissible. Such
acknowledgement may take the form of either state-sponsored
religious symbols, such as the erection of a creche on public
grounds, 6 or of ceremonial deism, a "class of public activity which
92. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
93. Id. at 592.
94. See id. at 592-93 (noting that concerns with government coercion are
heightened in elementary and secondary public school settings where peer
pressure increases the risk of coercion).
95. Id. at 631 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 657, 670 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part)); see Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (stating that the
Court's interpretation of the Establishment Clause should "comport[] with
what history reveals was the contemporaneous understanding of its
guarantees"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) ("[Hjistorical
evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause
applied to practice[s] authorized by the First Congress - their actions reveal
their intent.").
96. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (upholding the constitutionality of a city's
Christmas display in part because the city was merely "tak[ing] note of a
significant historical religious event long celebrated in the Western World").
... could be accepted as so conventional and uncontroversial as to
be constitutional." 97 Examples of seemingly permissible ceremonial
deism include: the national motto "In God We Trust" on currency,
the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
98
celebration of a national day of Thanksgiving. The Court has
reconciled such governmental acts with their religious elements by
holding that they are "protected from Establishment Clause
scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any
significant religious content."99
B. Application of the Lemon Test to North Carolina's Oath Statute
While much of the United States Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has produced inconsistent
results,' °° at least one principle is clear: neither the federal nor state
97. Epstein, supra note 41, at 2091 (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Book
Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964)).
98. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676.
99. Id. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But see, e.g., Epstein, supra note
41, at 2089. Professor Epstein disagrees with conventional wisdom. He
applies the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence to ten different
accepted uses of ceremonial deism and determines that many of them would
be held unconstitutional under the Court's prevailing doctrine.
100. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Lemon test "is difficult to apply and yields
unprincipled results" and "has produced only consistent unpredictability"); see
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave . . .Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence .... When we
wish to strike down a practice it forbids, we invoke it;
when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore
it entirely. . . . I agree with the long list of
constitutional scholars who have criticized Lemon and
bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry
of crooked lines and wavering shapes its intermittent
use has produced.
Id. (internal citations omitted). See generally William P. Marshall, "We Know
It When We See It": The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV.
495 (1986) (discussing the inconsistencies in Establishment Clause
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governments may "assert[] a preference for one religious
denomination or sect over others."' '° This concept was at the core
of the Framers' intent in crafting the First Amendment; according
to Madison, any preferential establishment "degrades from the
equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Religion do not
bend to those of the Legislative authority."'02  The Court has
recognized, however, that the prohibition on establishment does
not demand a total prohibition on religious advancement. Some
religious advancement may permissibly result from government
action, as long as it is merely indirect, remote, or incidental.'03 It is
therefore necessary to determine whether North Carolina's oath
statute produces only innocuous consequences or whether it
impermissibly prefers the holy text of one religion over all others.
Given the 1985 amendments to the oath statute '°4 and the
common law tradition of inclusiveness, 05 it may be assumed
arguendo that North Carolina could posit a legitimate secular
purpose for its oath statute: to provide a means of ensuring truthful
testimony and faithful jury service. Such a purpose would
presumably satisfy the "purpose" prong of Justice O'Connor's
refined Lemon test, which examines the message that the
government intends to communicate. However, this does not end
the analysis; under the second prong of Justice O'Connor's test, a
determination must be made as to whether the message North
Carolina actually communicates is legitimate.
Even if the statute's purpose is not to advance Christianity,
"the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by
Church and State provides a significant symbolic benefit to religion
jurisprudence). Professor Marshall notes that "[f]rom the outset, it has been
painfully clear that logical consistency and establishment clause jurisprudence
were to have little in common." Id. at 495.
101. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
102. Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted in JAMES
MADISON ON RELIGIous LIBERTY, supra note 63, at 58.
103. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
105. See discussion supra Parts II.A-B.
. . . by reason of the power conferred."""' Justice Brennan
recognized this in his dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly, in which he
argued that a city's display of a creche during the holiday season
provided this exact type of significant symbolic benefit to
Christianity because the "prestige of the government has been
conferred on the beliefs associated with the creche."'0 7  This
governmental association in turn has a devastating effect on both
non-adherents and non-believers. The government has proclaimed
that their religious views are not entitled to the same level of
respect as the view embraced by the government and therefore
need not be publicly recognized or supported. °8 Although the
majority of the Court disagreed with Justice Brennan in that
particular instance, the Court has consistently confirmed that by
favoring one religion to the exclusion of others, the government
sends an impermissible message to non-adherents "that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community," while
assuring adherents that "they are insiders, favored members .... "'09
These impermissible messages, however, are similar to
those sent by North Carolina's oath statute to the state's Islamic
and Christian communities. The state's interpretation of § 11-2
requires Muslims to use the Christian Bible if they desire to be
sworn in on a religious text. The North Carolina political
community will not treat Muslims as equals"O if they cannot
"embrace the Christian Bible and the God envisioned therein. ' ...
At the same time, the power and prestige'12 of the state are placed
behind the Christian religious text, thereby providing a significant
symbolic benefit to Christianity. These results suggest that the
advancement of Christianity occasioned by § 11-2 is not
insubstantial. In fact, although the Justices disagreed over the
106. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 798 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 125-26
(1982)).
107. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 701 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
108. Id.
109. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., __ U.S. __,125 S. Ct. 2722,
2733 (2005) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
110. Epstein, supra note 41, at 2145.
111. Id.
112. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
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degree of advancement resulting from the erection of the creche in
Lynch, the advancement in North Carolina appears to be greater.
In North Carolina courts, any Muslim who wishes to swear on a
religious text must swear on the Christian Bible. If such a rule were
applied in the Lynch context, not only would the creche stay in
place, but any Muslim who wished to erect a celebratory religious
display on public grounds would only be allowed to do so if he or
she erected a creche as well.
Commentators have warned that this type of state action
would "wound the civil community by compelling the severance of
religious minorities and thus fracturing the community. '  Such a
result has already followed in North Carolina, where Muslims have
found it necessary to resort to the courts in order to establish their
equality under state law.
11 4
C. Conclusion: North Carolina's Oath Statute is Unconstitutional
These outcomes demonstrate that even if North Carolina
has a secular legislative purpose for its oath statute (i.e., the
message it intends to communicate is legitimate), the message the
113. TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER
WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 158 (1998).
114. Consider the important perspective provided by the Fifth Circuit in
Meltzer v. Bd. Of Pub. Instruction of Orange County, Fla., 548 F.2d 559 (5th
Cir. 1977). The question in that case was the constitutionality of distributing
Christian Bibles to public schoolchildren. Framing the situation, the court
considered the converse: "If the Gideons, instead of distributing the King
James Bible had distributed the... Koran... through the school system of an
area whose inhabitants were strongly Protestant, we surmise that the
Protestant groups would feel a sectarian resentment against the actions of the
school authorities." Id. at 575 (quoting Brown v. Orange County Bd. of Pub.
Instruction, 128 So.2d 181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960)). For consideration of an
interesting hypothetical situation in which Muslims comprise the majority
population in the United States by the beginning of the twenty-second
century, see Epstein, supra note 41, at 2083-85. In this future society, oaths
are sworn on the Koran, and the national motto is "In Allah We Trust." Id. at
2084-85. Professor Epstein states that such practices, which seem like obvious
First Amendment violations in this context, have been erroneously upheld by
the Supreme Court in the context of our predominantly Christian society. Id.
at 2085.
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state actually communicates is unacceptable under the second
prong of Justice O'Connor's refined Lemon analysis. As
interpreted by judicial officials, § 11-2 violates the Establishment
Clause by preferring the holy text of one religion to the exclusion of
others. The state impermissibly confers a privileged status on
Christianity, while at the same time singles out a bona fide faith for
disadvantageous treatment. "5 Once the state's religious preference
is declared, the opportunity to affirm rather than to swear on a
Christian Bible may be of little consolation to the minority
adherent whose religious beliefs have been disrespected. Providing
the option to affirm merely serves to run-around the illegality of §
11-2, and the constitutional violation remains uncured.'1 6  The
ultimate result in North Carolina may be that the injured juror or
witness becomes "more likely to doubt the legitimacy of law
itself."
117
115. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, _ U.S. ___ 125 S. Ct. 2113, 2123 (2005)
(holding that a federal statute did not discriminate against non-mainstream
religious beliefs of prison inmates because the statute neither differentiated
among bona fide faiths nor conferred a privileged status on a particular sect).116 See infra text accompanying notes 148-57.
117. HALL, supra note 113, at 158. While the current focus of the injury
to the non-adherent has centered on the courtroom setting, the denial of
religious respect has broader implications. If a non-adherent cannot be
allowed to swear on the religious text of his or her choice, he or she will also
be precluded from doing so when taking the oath of any public office. Shaw
recognized that this would constitute a test oath "which is wholly repugnant to
the tolerant and enlightened spirit of our institutions and of the age in which
we live." Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 37, 43 (1856). As suggested above, the
availability of the option to affirm under § 11-4 does not solve this
constitutional problem, but merely provides a run-around the test oath as a
precursor to holding office. For those who wish to take their oath of office
upon a set of Holy Scriptures other than the Christian Bible, the constitutional
violation still exists. But cf. Belcher, supra note 72, at 301 (distinguishing test
oaths from juror oaths and affirmations because "[a] test oath asks one to
swear to a belief in God, whereas a juror oath merely asks the juror to uphold
the law and try the case fairly"). This may be definitionally true, but it ignores
the message of endorsement by the state that a juror must agree with in order
to exercise his or her right to be sworn on a religious text under § 11-2.
2006]
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IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RELIGIOUS COURTROOM
OATHS GENERALLY UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Although the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that an
optional religious oath is a permissible type of ceremonial deism,"
8
it has never undertaken a thorough analysis of the practice. Most
courts and commentators considering the issue have only touched
on it tangentially, and those that have upheld or supported the
practice usually perform a three-part analysis: they (1) assign
curative power to the existence of an affirmation option,"9 (2) find
that the religious option has no coercive effect upon jurors and
witnesses when allowed in conjunction with the affirmation
option,12° and (3) undertake a very basic historical investigation."'
This section will conduct a more thorough review of the religious
oath and its interplay with the nonreligious affirmation, and
determine whether these courts and commentators are correct in
finding that courtroom oaths pass the various Establishment Clause
tests.
A. Revisiting the Oath
The oath's religious and secular elements originally worked
in conjunction with each other to function properly. 1 2  Their
118. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952) (noting that the
First Amendment "does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State."). If the rule were rigid, according to the
Court, "'so help me God' in our courtroom oaths... and other references to
the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our ceremonies
would be flouting the First Amendment.").
119. See, e.g., Oliver v. State Tax Comm'n of Mo., 37 S.W.3d 243, 245
(Mo. 2001) ("Because the statute allows [plaintiff] the option to 'affirm' rather
than to swear.., the statute is Constitutional.").
120. See, e.g., Belcher, supra note 72, at 326-27 ("[T]he government
cannot compel a witness or juror to swear an oath that refers to God.
However, this problem is remedied and no such compulsion is present if a
nonreligious affirmation is available as an alternative.").
121. See, e.g., id. at 297-98 ("The fact that the Constitution repeatedly
requires oaths or affirmations indicates that the Framers thought both were
constitutional.").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
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purposes were intertwined; society believed that truthfulness could
only be absolutely guaranteed by a threat of supernatural
punishment.123 This belief changed with the advent of perjury laws
and the existence of an affirmation option.12 4 No longer did society
recognize the religious oath as the sole means of guaranteeing
truthfulness. Rather, truthfulness could also be guaranteed by
affirmation, temporal punishment, and criminal law:
[M]odern legislators, judges, and attorneys
think of the oath merely as a form to be gone
through by the witness, for the purpose of
notifying him that from the moment he
subscribes to it his words become of great
importance because they are spoken upon a
judicial occasion when the rights of others
depend upon them - that he is expected to tell
the truth without equivocation or concealment
- that should he fail to do so, his words will
probably be shown to be false by cross-
examination and that in case of detection,
punishment for perjury awaits him - a promise
is also exacted from the witness, to which, if he
be an honorable man.., he will strictly adhere.
All this the affirmation accomplishes. 125
The religious purpose became a separate, distinct element
of the oath, to be used at the election of the swearer as a
supplemental layer of assurance of the truth of his or her testimony.
North Carolina courts recognized, for example, that the law
required a two-fold guarantee of truthfulness from a witness: "[H]e
must be in the fear of punishment by the laws of man, and he must
also be in the fear of punishment by the laws of God, if he states
what is false .... ,,126
The religious and secular elements of the oath now act as
two separate means to achieve the same outcome - ensuring
123. Id.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 206-10.
125. White, supra note 21, at 426-27.
126. Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 37, 38 (1856).
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truthfulness - rather than working together as the sole means of
achieving this objective. The necessary starting point for
Establishment Clause analysis is to determine whether it is
constitutionally permissible to use a religious means to promote the
secular purpose of securing truth and fair judgment, when such a
117purpose is equally achievable by using an affirmation.
B. Purpose Prong: Achieving a Secular Purpose through Religious
Means
128
In Abington v. Schempp, the United States Supreme
Court considered a Pennsylvania statute that required daily Bible
reading in public schools. Under the statute, ten Bible verses would
be read every morning, but individual students could be excused
from the exercise with a written request from a parent.1'9 The state
offered a plethora of secular purposes for the statute, including "the
promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic
trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions, and the
teaching of literature." ' 3 Thus, the Court was faced with a situation
127. In the following Establishment Clause discussion, the entanglement
analysis (see supra text accompanying notes 85-86) is minor and is not
dispositive in the case of oath statutes. However, it does merit brief attention.
The entanglement at issue here does not involve government acting in
conjunction with religious officials; rather, it involves an administrative
problem in ensuring that all citizens have the opportunity to swear in the
manner they deem most appropriate. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
702 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). If, under the Establishment Clause, a
juror or witness must be allowed to select his or her own religious text for the
oath ceremony (see discussion supra Parts III.B-C), "non-Christian groups...
can be expected to press government for inclusion of their symbols, and faced
with such requests, government will have to become involved in
accommodating the various demands." Lynch, 465 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). This has already taken place in North Carolina, where the courts
have become involved in accommodating (or refusing to accommodate) the
demands made by Muslim jurors and witnesses, as well as prominent Islamic
groups in the community. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
128. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
129. Id. at 205.
130. Id. at 223.
in which a state was using a religious means to promote secular
goals.
The Court struck down the statute as unconstitutional and
in doing so, made three critical findings. First, it found that even if
the state's purpose in passing the statute was not strictly religious, it
was accomplished through an instrument of religion.1 31 Second, the
state itself recognized that its statute had a pervading religious
character because it allowed students to be excused from the
exercises with parental consent."' Third, these two facts were
inconsistent with the state's argument that the Bible was used
merely for the secular teaching of literature or for nonreligious
moral inspiration.13  Based on these findings, the Court held that
the statute required a religious exercise in violation of the
Establishment Clause' 34 Further, the violation could not be cured
merely because students were permitted to be excused from the
exercise.135 The Constitution thus "enjoins those involvements of
religious with secular institutions which ... use essentially religious
means to serve governmental ends where secular means would
suffice. ,36
There is a striking similarity between the Pennsylvania
statute in Abington and statutes that require a religious courtroom
oath. If a state's oath statute were challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds, the state would likely assert the secular purpose of
ensuring truthfulness and fair judgment. Such an assertion,
however, would fail under Abington based on the same three




135. Id. at 224-25 (noting that the constitutional violation is not
"mitigated by the fact that individual students may absent themselves ... for
that fact furnishes no defense to a claim of unconstitutionality"); see also
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (holding that the fact that
participation in a public school prayer is voluntary does not "serve to free it
from the limitations of the Establishment Clause," which "does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the
enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not").
136. Abington, 374 U.S. at 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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findings the Court found persuasive, as noted above. First, even if
the state's purpose is not strictly religious, it is being accomplished
through the use of an instrument of religion. Second, the states
which still have oath statutes recognize the religious nature of the
swearing ceremony because they all allow the juror or witness to be
"excused," i.e., he or she may affirm rather than swear. 7 Third,
these facts are inconsistent with the state's argument that the Bible
is used merely for the secular security of truth and fair judgment.
Under Abington, then, it appears that the oath statute requires a
religious exercise in violation of the Establishment Clause, and that
this violation may not be cured by the existence of an option to
affirm.
Indeed, the Abington principle has been held applicable in
situations where a statutory scheme provides both a religious and a
secular means of achieving the same goal. The Court was presentedr r 138
with such a scheme in Wallace v. Jaifree. Alabama enacted two
related statutes concerning a moment of silence in public schools.
The first statute authorized a one-minute period of silence for
meditation, and the second authorized a period of silence for either
meditation or voluntary prayer. ' While the Court recognized that
a student has a right to engage in voluntary prayer at school, it also
held that this right was fully protected by the first statute.
'40
Further, the second statute served no secular purpose that was not
fully served by the first.14' According to the Court, only two
possible conclusions could be drawn from this finding, neither of
which were acceptable: either "the statute was enacted to convey a
message of state endorsement and promotion of prayer; or [] the
statute was enacted for no purpose.,
142
Likewise, it is difficult to posit a secular purpose served by
an oath statute that is not fully served by the affirmation statute.
By allowing an affirmation option, a state recognizes that its
interests in securing guarantees from jurors and witnesses are
137. See infra note 213 and accompanying text.
138. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id. at 59.
141. Id.
142. Id.
adequately served by the affirmation statute. Under the reasoning
in Wallace, only two conclusions could be drawn from the adjacent
oath statute. The first - the statute was enacted for no purpose - is
easily disposed, considering the history of oaths and the reasons for
their adoption. 43  The remaining conclusion, that the modern
purpose of the oath statute is to convey a message of state
endorsement and promotion of divine invocation in the courtroom,
must therefore be true.
The Supreme Court recently applied this principle in
McCreary v. ACLU,'" which involved two Kentucky counties
posting the Ten Commandments in their courthouses. 4 5  The
ACLU filed suit, and the counties responded by posting displays
entitled "The Foundations of American Law and Government,"
which included the Magna Carta, Declaration of Independence, Bill
of Rights, the national motto "In God We Trust," and a version of
the Ten Commandments with more emphasis placed on the
religious language contained therein.'"
In addressing the constitutionality of these displays, the
Court conducted a Lemon analysis. "41 It relied on a "reasonable
observer" standard'4 to determine whether the government action
'49had a predominantly religious purpose. While the Court noted
that the government was owed some deference, its posited secular
purpose must nevertheless "be genuine, not a sham, and not merely
secondary to a religious objective.' ' 15 0 Further, in the companion
case to McCreary, the Court stressed that while the Ten
Commandments have a clear religious message, this fact is not
conclusive. Rather, the message conveyed by the Commandments
must be determined by examining context and by evaluating "how
the text is used.'
15
'
143. See discussion supra Parts II.A and IV.A.
144. 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005).
145. Id. at 2728.
146. Id. at 2731.
147. Id. at 2732.
148. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2734.
150. Id. at 2735.
151. Van Orden v. Perry, __ U.S. 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2869 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis in original); see County of Allegheny v.
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The context of the Commandments display suggested that it
had been modified by adding other documents only to appease
those who found it offensive. As a result, the Court found that the
only conclusion to be drawn by the reasonable observer was that
the county's purpose was to "emphasize and celebrate the
Commandments' religious message,"' 5 2 and that the display had
been modified only to allow the religious document to remain,
while complying with the constitutional requirement of religious
neutrality.
5 3
In the context of religious oaths, the reasonable observer
test appears equally dispositive. While courtroom oaths may
originally have had an interwoven secular and religious purpose,14
the affirmation option makes the oath's religious purpose distinct
from its secular one.' Thus, where the use of a religious text is
justified based on a supposed secular purpose already accomplished
through affirmation, "the insistence of the religious message is hard
to avoid in the absence of a context plausibly suggesting a message
going beyond an excuse to promote the religious point of view.'
56
ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) ("[T]he question
is 'what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the display.' That
inquiry, of necessity, turns upon the context in which the contested object
appears ... ") (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
152. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2738.
153. Id. at 2741.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 39-40.
155. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26.
156. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2738. Indeed, it has repeatedly been
recognized that claiming a chiefly secular purpose for a religious activity is an
insult to the individuals to whom the practice - here, swearing in a religious
text - is a deeply religious act. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 797-98
(1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]o claim a secular purpose for [legislative]
prayer is an insult to the perfectly honorable individuals who instituted and
continue the practice."); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992)
(holding that, in response to a claim that a prayer offered at a high school
graduation was merely a minimal religious intrusion, "the embarrassment and
the intrusion of the religious exercise cannot be refuted by arguing that these
prayers ... are of a de minimis character. To do so would be an affront to the
rabbi who offered them and to all those for whom the prayers were an
essential and profound recognition of divine authority.") (emphasis in
original). Further, claiming a secular purpose for a Bible oath can be said to
degrade religion by allowing a religious call for God to bear witness to be
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In McCreary, context suggested that the only reasonable
explanation of government purpose for the "Foundations of
American Law" display was the counties' desire to display religious
objects in their courts while still purporting to embrace religious
neutrality. Likewise, in taking an oath, a reasonable observer might
suspect that a state crafted its oath-or-affirmation statutory solution
merely to preserve the use of religious texts in courts while using an
"opt-out" to satisfy the constitutional demand of religious
neutrality. 57 Under McCreary, this constitutes a "sham" purpose to
support an oath statute. The religious purpose supersedes the
secular purpose, and the statute is unconstitutional.
What, then, are the secular arguments for retaining the
oath? One commentator suggests that the oath should remain in
effect because statistics show that more people choose to swear an
oath than to affirm.'5 However, the coercive effect of the swearing159
process may be largely accountable for this statistical fact, and an
Establishment Clause challenge will not fail merely because a
majority of the population engages in the challenged activity.
Another argument for retaining the oath is that "removing one of
the barriers to falsehood [would] encourage false testimony and
tend materially to lessen the confidence of the public in the
administration of justice. '16 The existence of perjury penalties
weakens this argument, and further, it is nothing more than an
unwarranted, albeit expected, fear that naturally arises in response
-. • 161
to a proposed change to a long-standing tradition. A final
argument for retention of the oath is to appease the "large class of
entangled with a secular call to tell the truth. See Marsh 463 U.S. at 808 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Legislative prayer ... has the potential for
degrading religion by allowing a religious call to worship to be intermeshed
with a secular call to order."). But cf. Belcher, supra note 72, at 301 ("The fact
that juror oaths may contain the words 'solemnly swear' and 'So help me God'
does not amount to a requirement of belief in God.").
157. See also Epstein, supra note 41, at 2146 (agreeing that a reasonable
viewer could only conclude that Bible use in the courtroom signifies the
government's support for and approval of the text).
158. Belcher, supra note 72, at 330.
159. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
160. White, supra note 21, at 431.
161. Id.
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persons who.., still believe that there is some special punishment
reserved for those who violate an oath, other than that which would
be suffered by one who tells an untruth ... when testifying upon
affirmation.' ' 16 2 While such a class may exist, it would seem
fundamentally at odds with the Establishment Clause to allow a
state to enact a statute with the purpose of securing an afterlife
reward for those who abide by its commands or an afterlife
punishment for those who violate them.
It appears uncertain, and perhaps unlikely, that a state
could posit a valid secular purpose to support its oath statute. The
question remains whether the message actually conveyed by the
state could satisfy the second prong of Justice O'Connor's refined
Lemon test.
C. Effects Prong: Coercion in the Swearing Process
John Sidoti knows all too well the problems that can arise
out of religious courtroom oaths. His troubles began when he
appeared as a defendant in small claims court. The long-time North
Carolina resident chose to affirm, rather than to swear, before
providing his testimony. Mr. Sidoti recalls the events that followed:
The plaintiff badgered me continuously about
not putting my hand on the [B]ible and
swearing before I took the stand. He said I was
going to lie and I was afraid of what was going
to happen to me as a result. He bragged about
how he wasn't afraid to put his hand on the
Bible. I had to keep asking the Magistrate to
reprimand him for bringing this issue up, since I
had affirmed and the court had accepted this as
evidence that I would be telling the truth.
Unfortunately for Mr. Sidoti, this was not merely an
isolated incident. He later appeared as a plaintiff in a civil case and
again asked to affirm. The judge asked Mr. Sidoti to raise his right
162. Id. at 431-32.
163. The following anecdotes were told to the author in: Email from
John Sidoti to Dan Blau (Nov. 7, 2005, 22:52:56 EST) (on file with author).
hand, and he informed the judge that he could not do this as part of
his affirmation, as it connoted recognition of a God. The judge
"cocked her head to the side and stared at me as if to say I was
weird," Mr. Sidoti recalls. He lost the case and felt that he "might
have been discriminated against because I had embarrassed and
challenged the judge's belief system."
Having concluded that he simply could not be victorious in
court if he affirmed, Mr. Sidoti "decided to go against [his]
principles and do as everyone else and swear." He immediately
regretted this choice of action. After another appearance in court
in which he swore, Mr. Sidoti became upset because "I felt that I
was swearing to a god that I did not believe in, and ironically and
paradoxically, was swearing that I wouldn't tell a lie!" Both
affirming and swearing were now untenable options.
In the summer of 2005, Mr. Sidoti received a summons for
jury duty in Transylvania County, North Carolina. He was honored
and excited to perform his civic duty, though he was wary knowing
that he would again need to be sworn. At the courthouse, the judge
greeted Mr. Sidoti and his fellow potential jurors while the clerk of
court began lining up Bibles on the rail at the front of the
courtroom. The jury pool was called down to the rail and, one row
at a time, swore their juror oath on the Bibles. When Mr. Sidoti's
row was called, he informed the clerk that he wanted to affirm. The
clerk turned to the judge and shouted, "[w]e have one who wants to
affirm!" The judge shouted back to the clerk, instructing her to
swear the others, and to save Mr. Sidoti for last. Once again, Mr.
Sidoti was singled out for exercising his right to affirm. He recalls:
On my drive home I was very depressed and
embarrassed that I had [been singled out], and
that the court had not explained to anyone that
affirming, rather than swearing, was an option.
In fact, from all appearances, the way the
Bibles were methodically laid out as if by rote,
[suggested that] this was the only way to
become a juror. At least if affirmation were
stated by the court as an option, that would
have given my act some credibility and [would
not have made] me feel like the only outsider
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to be on the jury. I began wondering [if the
other jurors] would be biased against me now
... [and how they] would consider my views in
a jury room now that [they] knew I was not
mainstream.
The case never went to trial, so Mr. Sidoti was not able to
discern the effect his affirmation had on his fellow jurors. His
experiences, however, demonstrate one of the fundamental
constitutional difficulties regarding religious courtroom oaths.
To the framers, noncoercion was the cornerstone of the
notion of separation of church and state.'6 Jefferson's insistence
that "no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship"'' 65 has long been celebrated by the Supreme
Court. In Lee v. Weisman,'6 for example, the Court held
unconstitutional a prayer at a public high school graduation
ceremony for fear that students would be coerced into participating
in the prayer. The Court stated that at the very least, the
Establishment Clause prohibits the government from coercing
support for, or participation in, any religious exercise.16 Coercion
need not be direct in order for a government action to be
unconstitutional: "When the power, prestige, and financial support
of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the
indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."'"
Courts and scholars who have examined the coercive effects
of religious courtroom oaths under existing state statutes have
generally concluded that no coercion exists if a juror or witness is
allowed to affirm rather than to swear.169 This is true in the sense
164. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80.
165. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
166. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
167. Id. at 587.
168. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962).
169. See, e.g., People v. Velarde, 616 P.2d 104, 106 (Colo. 1980) (en banc)
("It is not a violation of the first amendment establishment clause to require
jurors either to take an oath or to affirm.") (emphasis in original); Pierce v.
Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Ky. 1966) (upholding a juror oath
containing the words "so help me God" because "any person, including a
juror, has the privilege of substituting an affirmation for an oath."); Jones v.
that, by allowing an affirmation option, the government cannot
disqualify or hold in contempt a witness or juror for declining to
swear on a religious text. However, this conclusion is too narrow,
as it considers only direct compulsion, ignores Lee's charge to
examine indirect compulsion and therefore misunderstands the true
nature of the coercion at play. A broader analysis reveals the
presence of indirectly coercive forces, which are demonstrated by
considering the plight of both the non-believing or non-Christian
juror and witness.
We begin with the non-believing juror. The juror may
simply affirm his or her promise to judge fairly and is not required
to swear on a religious text. However, the affirming party is then
put in the difficult position of having to "publicly declare her
disbelief in front of (and with the likely perception of disapproval
of) a judge and her fellow citizens.",171 If he or she chooses to
affirm, the government has essentially coerced a "confession of
nonbelief"1 7' from the party. Rather than endure the actual or
perceived disapproval of those present, the juror may instead
choose to swear on the Bible and is thus coerced to swear a belief in
a God he or she does not worship. This situation is especially likely
when judicial officials simply present the juror with a Bible without
informing the juror of his or her statutory options. The non-
believing juror, not wanting to cause a stir, must make an on-the-
spot decision whether to protest or to obey. The state may
statutorily allow the juror an "out," but by withholding this
information and presenting the juror with a Bible, it substantially
burdens the juror's ability to exercise his or her statutory right to
affirm.
State, 585 P.2d 1340, 1341 (Nev. 1978) (per curiam) ("Where an affirmation is
permitted in lieu of an oath, a juror's freedom of religion is not violated.");
Belcher, supra note 72, at 326-27 ("[T]he government cannot compel a witness
or juror to swear an oath that refers to God. However, this problem is
remedied and no such compulsion is present if a nonreligious affirmation is
available as an alternative."); cf Nicholson v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 338 F. Supp. 48
(M.D. Ala. 1972) (finding unconstitutional a state law that required an oath to
include the words "so help me God," but did not permit the option to affirm).
170. Epstein, supra note 41, at 2147.
171. Id.
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Even a non-believing juror who may otherwise be willing to
reveal his or her non-belief may feel coerced to swear on the Bible
for fear that his or her opinion will not be respected by the other
jurors. This concern is especially heightened when every other
juror takes a Bible oath without apparent reservation, and the
nonbeliever must either do the same or be singled out for his or her
desire to affirm.
Turning to the non-believing or non-Christian witness, a
new set of problems and coercive pressures arise during the oath
ceremony. Like the juror, the witness must either publicly reveal
his or her non-belief or swear to a God that he or she does not
recognize. Just as the juror feels compelled to swear in order to
maintain credibility with his or her peers, the witness feels
compelled to swear on the Bible so that the jury will believe and
give proper weight to his or her testimony. This coercion is
especially problematic when a defendant testifies on his or her own
behalf, for his or her own fate is at stake when the bailiff
approaches with a Bible. If every witness for the prosecution, for
example, has sworn on the Bible, the defendant may perceive the
need to endure "spiritual pollution" ' in order to ensure favor with
the jury.'73
The non-believing or non-Christian witness has four equally
untenable choices when faced with this type of coercion. First, the
witness may affirm and endure the resulting actual or perceived
prejudicial effect of this in the minds of the jury. After choosing
this option, for example, John Sidoti noted that he "could not help
[but] feel that as a result of my action I wouldn't get a fair and
impartial hearing. Whether or not this is true or only perceived by
me makes no difference .. .. ,74 Second, the non-Christian witness
172. See HALL, supra note 113, at 158 (arguing that "civic religious
exercises force religious minorities to sever civil communion to avoid spiritual
pollution").
173. See Elizabeth A. Brooks, Note, Thou Shalt Not Quote the Bible:
Determining the Propriety of Attorney Use of Religious Philosophy and
Themes in Oral Arguments, 33 GA. L. REV. 1113, 1115-16 (1999) (suggesting
that even if a witness or defendant chooses to affirm, he or she may still
ingratiate his or herself with the jury simply by carrying a Bible into court).
174. Email from John Sidoti to Dan Blau, supra note 163; see Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) ("[F]or the dissenter .. .who has a
may swear on his or her own religious text and again endure the
actual or perceived prejudicial effect of this action in the minds of
the jury. This could implicate a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment 17' right to an impartial jury if significant jury bias
results. In the post-September 11 world, for example, an Islamic
defendant will be acutely aware of the fact that he or she may
greatly damage his or her testimony by exercising the right to swear
, 176
an oath to Allah on the Qu 'ran. Further, religious prejudice in
America does not start and end with Islam; any nonconventional
religious adherent, such as a Wiccan or Satanist, may face similar
difficulties on the witness stand. 77 The witness' third option would
be to yield to the coercive pressure and swear in on the Bible.
Regardless of the state's actual intent, it impermissibly forces a
defendant to choose between ensuring a fair trial and adhering to
his or her own non-Christian religious beliefs. As was the case with
reasonable perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner
her conscience will not allow, the injury is ... real.").
175. U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury ....").
176. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Jury in Practice: When All of Us Are
Victims: Juror Prejudice and "Terrorist" Trials, 78 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1143
(2003). The author investigates a post-September 11, 2001, prosecution of a
Muslim suspected of providing financial support to AI-Qaeda. He recalls an
incident in which the defendant's attorney stated: "One has to question
whether a fair and impartial jury could be found anywhere in America today
that could sit in judgment of an Arab-American in a case involving allegations
of terrorism." Id. at 1145 (citing Mike Robinson, Muslim Charity Leader
Pleads Guilty, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 11, 2003, at 5A); see also,
e.g., James Curry Woods, The Third Tower: The Effect of the September 1 h
Terrorist Attacks on the American Jury System, 55 ALA. L. REV. 209 (2003)
(discussing Muslim-Americans' fear of the erosion of their constitutional
rights in the American jury system). See generally Mohamed Nimer, Muslims
in America After 9-11, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & CULTURE 1, 14-22 (Fall 2002/Winter
2003) (discussing the "anti-Muslim backlash" following September 11, 2001).
177. Even Ms. Rudinger, the executive director of the ACLU-NC, has
acknowledged that although a defendant may have a right to swear in on a
Satanist text, "[i]f I were an attorney who had a witness who wanted to, I
might ask my witness to choose another option." Radio Interview by Donna
Martinez, supra note 2. Cf., e.g., Flanagan v. State, 109 Nev. 50 (1993)
(holding unconstitutional a prosecutor's effort to prove a criminal defendant's
bad character by introducing evidence that he was a Satanist, because such
beliefs, though offensive to many, were protected by the First Amendment).
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John Sidoti, choosing the former option can have deleterious
ethical and emotional consequences for the swearing party.1
78
Finally, a non-believing witness who does not care whether he or
she affirms or swears may recognize that his or her testimony might
actually be enhanced by swearing on the Bible, and may
"deceptively" swear an oath to a God in which he or she does not
believe. The witness is using the oath in a "'deliberate attempt[] to
destroy the objectivity and impartiality' of juries, causing the
'verdict to be a product of the emotion rather than reflective
judgment.' 1 79
Skeptics of the coercion argument argue that the types of
coercive pressures present in Lee are absent in oath ceremonies. In
Lee, the Court found that indirect coercive pressures were at work
because of the setting in which the religious exercise took place: a
high school graduation ceremony.' °  The Court noted that
teenagers, especially sensitive to peer pressure in social situations,
were more likely to be coerced into conformity and participation in
the religious exercise. '8 In contrast, in Marsh v. Chambers,'2 the
Court found that adults are "presumably not readily susceptible to
'religious indoctrination' . . . or peer pressure.' 83
The inquiry, however, cannot end upon such generalizedS 184
assumptions. A closer reading of Lee suggests that the same
factors rendering the graduation prayer coercive also exist in the
courtroom context.'8 ' In Lee, the Court stressed that a dissenter
may not be forced to choose between participating in a religious
178. See supra text accompanying note 163.
179. Brooks, supra note 173, at 1138 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991)) (recognizing the prejudicial nature of
prosecutors' Biblical references in the sentencing phase of capital murder
trials).
180. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992).
181. Id.
182. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
183. Id. at 792.
184. See id. at 798 (Brennan. J., dissenting). Justice Brennan disagreed
with the majority's seemingly per se rule regarding adult coercion, finding
"uncertain[ty] as to whether it is even factually correct." Id. at 798 n.5.
185. See Epstein, supra note 41, at 2147.
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exercise or protesting.8 Due to the unique type of peer pressure in
a high school setting, a teenage student will be more likely to
participate. The government will then have succeeded in using
social pressure to indirectly enforce a religious orthodoxy.8 7 These
concerns are equally present in the courtroom setting. While an
adult juror or witness may be less susceptible to religious
indoctrination, the pressure to conform is greatly increased when it
takes place in a courtroom. For a witness who commands the
attention of the judge, court officials, parties to the litigation, the
general public, and most importantly, a jury of his or her peers, the
social pressure to swear a religious oath may be overwhelming. The
power and prestige of the courtroom places the same type of
indirect coercive pressure"8 upon jurors and witnesses as does a
high school graduation for students.
The Court in Lee undertook this type of contextual analysis
when distinguishing the case from Marsh. There, the Court upheld
a prayer at the beginning of a legislative session, finding that
coercive pressures were absent in this long-practiced tradition.' 9
Lee distinguished the high school graduation context based on two
important findings. First, in the legislature, adults could come and
go as they pleased and were not subject to the potential pressures of
a fundamentally important graduation ceremony.' ° Thus, "[t]he
influence and force of a formal exercise in a school graduation are
far greater than the prayer exercise [the Court] condoned in
Marsh."'9' Second, unlike the legislature in Marsh, the school
officials at the high school graduation in Lee "retain[ed] a high
degree of control over the precise contents of the program, the
speeches, the timing, the movements, the dress, and the decorum of
the students .... [T]he student was left with no alternative but to
submit."' ' These two findings by the Court weigh heavily towards
the existence of a coercive pressure in the courtroom. In court,
186. Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
187. Id. at 593-94.
188. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962).
189. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
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adults do not enter and leave without comment and for any
reason;193 rather, the entire focus of the court, jury, and observers is
on the witness. The court retains a high degree of control over the
timing of the proceedings, the content of the litigation, and the
decorum of the participants. A trial is thus a formal exercise with
more coercive potential than a legislative prayer session, and
possesses at least as much potential to coerce as a high school
graduation exercise. Jurors and witnesses may perceive that they
are left with no alternative but to submit to such coercive pressures.
D. Historical Analysis: A Trend Towards Removal of Religion from
Courtrooms
The Supreme Court has held that the Establishment Clause
does not erect an impenetrable wall between church and state, as
such an interpretation "would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history.' ' 94 A challenged
government action must therefore be examined in light of historical
practice and understanding, ' 95  including long-standing
"[g]overnment policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and
support for religion."'' 96 In Marsh, for example, the Court found
that the practice of opening a legislative session with a prayer has
survived since colonial times and "has coexisted with the principles
of disestablishment and religious freedom.' ' 97 Oaths of office and
prayers opening judicial proceedings are also presumed to be
constitutional in light of historical tradition.
193. Id.
194. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
195. Id. at 673.
196. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492
U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
197. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983).
198. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa., v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
213 (1963). This Note should not be read to suggest that oaths of office fail
Establishment Clause analysis. It does not consider this issue in depth, but
does note that many of the specific coercive pressures exerted upon jurors and
witnesses are not present during a ceremony in which an elected official
swears an oath of office. In such situations, the official will presumably exert a
certain amount of control over his or her own ceremony. Further, having
At first glance, it would seem reasonable to suggest that
religious judicial oaths satisfy the "historical practice" test simply
because they were widely accepted and implemented throughout
history, including in America at the time of her founding. While a
tradition such as the court oath may be entitled to constitutional
deference, the Supreme Court has nonetheless made it clear that
''no one acquires a vested or protected right in violation of the
Constitution by long use, even when that span of time covers our
entire national existence and indeed predates it."'' 99
The Supreme Court recently affirmed that the mere
existence of a practice at the time of the founding does not itself
render that activity constitutional.' °° The "argument for... original
understanding," noted the Court in McCreary, "is flawed from the
outset by its failure to consider the full range of evidence showing
what the Framers believed . . . . The historical record .. . is
complicated." 20' For example, while the recognition of a national
day of Thanksgiving to God was first proclaimed by George
Washington and continues to be celebrated today, Thomas
Jefferson, one of the foremost proponents of religious liberty at the
time of the founding, believed that Thanksgiving proclamations
• . 202
were unconstitutional. Based on this and other examples of the
Founders' disagreement over the proper degree of separation
between church and state, the McCreary Court concluded that
"[t]he fair inference is that there was no common understanding
about the limits of the establishment prohibition."2 0 '
already been elected, the swearer's religious beliefs are presumably not
subject to the same amount of actual or perceived prejudice by those
observing the event.
199. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 678).
200. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. at 2722, 2744
(2005).
201. Id. at 2743-44.
202. Id. at 2744 (citing Letter from T. Jefferson to S. Miller (Jan. 23,
1808), in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, at 98 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner
eds., 1987)).
203. McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2744.
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In addition, modern America is a more religiously
pluralistic society than it was at the time of the founding.204
Increased religious diversity raises a need to reevaluate historical
practices based on contemporary norms. Even practices that
enjoyed the full support of the Founders may be considered
offensive and constitutionally unacceptable in modern times.05
A number of developments in the past centuries of the
Anglo-American legal tradition have changed the nature of the
judicial oath and hence, its necessity. First, the advent of perjury
laws represented society's recognition that relying on the threat of
supernatural punishment for false swearing did not alone guarantee
truthfulness. Some imposition of temporal punishment was
necessary to secure this guarantee. 20 6 Various factors may have
contributed to this, including recognition that witnesses often lied
after swearing their oaths, or doubt that the perjurer would ever
receive supernatural punishment. 2°7 As society's trust in the oath to
serve its intended purposes waned, so too did society's belief in its
• 208
necessity. Further, with the Omichund decision,2 0 9 there came a
recognition that the form of the oath, or the God to whom it was
directed, was of no import, so long as it impressed upon the witness
the duty to tell the truth. Finally, allowing an affirmation option
made the oath a purely individual exercise. Those who chose to
wager their afterlife on their testimony were free to do so. As for
those who did not, society no longer needed to demand this because
it had an even greater method of ensuring truthfulness - temporal
punishment for perjury. The secular goals of the oath were
210accomplished in their entirety by the affirmation.
204. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa., v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 240
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 240-41 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]ur interpretation of the
First Amendment must necessarily be responsive to the much more highly
charged nature of religious questions in contemporary society.").
206. White, supra note 21, at 419.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Omichund v. Barker, 125 Eng. Rep. 1310 (1744); see supra text
accompanying notes 57-61.
210. White, supra note 21, at 426-27.
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Legal scholars have debated the idea that religious oaths are
no longer necessary or useful since the start of the nineteenth
century.21' Trends in the states' oath statutes reflect this debate,
specifically regarding both the inclusion of the religious language in
such statutes as well as the use of the Bible in administering an
oath 2  Like North Carolina, every state has a statute or rule
allowing a person to affirm rather than to recite a religious oath.2 3
Most states still contain references to God or other religious
language in their oath statutes, but for the most part, these are
relatively minor, such as using the phrase "so help you God, 214 as a
postscript. Only eight states require the swearer to raise the right
hand,"' a vestige of the early form of swearing an oath which
216included raising a hand towards heaven, and only seven states
require as their "default" option that the swearer actually lay his or
217her hands upon or kiss the Bible . At least one of these states,
211. Id. at 427.
212. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 45-49 (providing a
discussion of the changing language of North Carolina's oath statute).
213. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 11-4 ("When a person to be sworn shall
have conscientious scruples against taking an oath.., he shall be permitted to
be affirmed .... [T]he word 'affirm' shall be substituted for the word 'swear'
and the words 'so help me God' shall be deleted.").
214. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 1254 (2005) ("You swear, that in
all causes committed to you, you will give a true verdict therein, according to
the law and evidence given you. So help you God.") (emphasis added). Other
states using religious language in judicial oath statutes include Ala., Ariz.,
Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Ga., Idaho., Ill., Kan., Me., Md., Mass.,
Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C.,
N.D., Ohio, Okla., Or., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash.,
W. Va., Wis., and Wyo.
215. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-22 (2004) ("The ceremony to be
used, by persons to whom an oath is administered, shall be the holding up of
the right hand .... "). Other states requiring a raised hand include Mass.,
Mich., Minn., N.H., Or., Wis., and Wyo.
216. See supra text accompanying note 34.
217. See, e.g., DEL C. tit. 10, § 5321 (2005) ("The usual oath.., shall be
by swearing upon the Holy Evangels of Almighty God."). Other states
requiring the use of a Bible include Ark., Kan., N.J., N.C., Pa., and Va. Two
additional states, S.C. and Ill., have statutes that suggest that a Bible oath is
allowable, but is not required by law. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1130
(2004) ("[A]ffirmation ... must be held as valid and effectual as if the person
had taken an oath on the Holy Bible.").
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North Carolina, has recently amended its oath statute by removing
218
some of the religious language present therein. It also comes as
no surprise that of the seven states that still use Bible swearing, five
are among the original thirteen colonies, which were more likely to
import this English tradition into their state law. Thus, since the
1790s, the large majority of states have either never required that a
Bible be used when administering an oath or have since removed
the Bible oath requirement from their statutes. This fact may also
be reflective of a larger trend to remove religious objects and
references from American courts.219
CONCLUSION
The analysis of Supreme Court precedent indicates that
courts and commentators evaluating the constitutionality of
religious courtroom oaths consistently commit a three-part
analytical error: they (1) assign too much curative power to the
existence of an affirmation option, (2) ignore or misunderstand the
coercive effect that the religious option has upon jurors and
witnesses when allowed in conjunction with the affirmation option,
220
and (3) undertake a one-sided, narrow historical analysis.
A more refined analysis demonstrates that religious
courtroom oaths raise concerns at each step of the current
Establishment Clause analysis. This indicates that a re-evaluation
of the constitutionality of religious oath statutes is warranted, with
more thoughtful consideration given to the various issues presented
by such statutes. Even if the oath were to pass constitutional
muster, independent reasons exist to reconsider their use in our
judicial system. Some amount of coercion, however minimal, still
exists when a non-believing or non-Christian juror or witness is
presented with a Christian Bible upon which to swear, after his or
218. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
219. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005)
(holding that the placement of a Ten Commandments display in a courtroom
was an Establishment Clause violation); Brooks, supra note 172 (describing
the ways in which many courts are beginning to limit religious references in
oral arguments).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 119-21.
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her peers have already done so, and when he or she is not made
aware of the legal alternatives. Further, the denial of religious
equality to Islamic citizens in North Carolina is an unfortunate
example of the results that arise in construing oath statutes in
support of Christianity and against other religions.
In 1882, scholar Edward A. Thomas observed a strange
phenomenon concerning the use of religious courtroom oaths. On
the one hand, non-religious members of society found the religious
oath to be wholly inappropriate, while on the other, certain
Christians viewed oath-taking as blasphemous. He remarked:
[W]hat benefits can accrue from maintaining a
practice which shocks the sensibilities of one
class of the community and excites the derision
of another? Why would it not be sufficient if
the laws provided ample penalties against all
who should give false evidence upon the
witness stand... ? Why not adopt a rule which
in this enlightened age will permit all citizens of
this great country, [whatever] their beliefs ...
to give their testimony in court . . . under
precisely similar forms, without enacting what
many seem to be a sacrilege to one and a
mummery to another?22'
This suggestion remains relevant and applicable today.
Tradition alone cannot support a practice that, at worst, is
administered in a discriminatory manner by the states at the
expense of religious minorities, and at best, treats all religions
equally but enforces a religious orthodoxy through either subtle or
overt pressure to conform. Additionally, under any circumstance,
the religious courtroom oath is a practice that could be set aside
with virtually no effect upon either the administration of justice or
the free exercise of religion. In our judicial system, all are equal
before the law. It is this tradition that is paramount, not the
preservation of the religious courtroom oath.
221. White, supra note 21 at 429-30.
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